The paper investigates the credibility of an intermediary's advice in a bilateral trade model. A seller and a buyer with private and independent valuations exchange a unit of good. Trade is mediated by an intermediary, who observes a coarse signal about the buyer's valuation and may reveal it to the seller before bargaining. We show that if the broker gets a fixed per-transaction fee, he can fully transmit information via cheap talk. This information transmission increases ex ante welfare of the seller and the broker but has an ambiguous impact on the buyer. We show that limits to informative communication may arise if the intermediary observes signals about valuations of both participants or because of competition between intermediaries. Finally, using mechanism design approach, we show that choosing an appropriate system of two-part tariffs allows the intermediary to secure the same expected profit as in the optimal direct mechanism.
Introduction
Bilateral bargaining often takes place under asymmetric information. The parties may seek better information about the other side trying to improve their bargaining positions. Natural sources of such information are intermediaries that in many cases also implement the transactions. Indeed, a large fraction of real estate transactions are mediated by realtors, almost all IPOs are mediated by investment banks and art sales are often mediated by specialized dealers, etc. These intermediaries often have superior information about the demand for (or the supply of) the item being sold, and, sometimes, about the private valuation of a particular buyer or seller.
The informed intermediaries may a¤ect the outcomes of bargaining if they reveal their information in the form of advice. In case of art auctions, auction house experts help sellers to set reserve prices and, at the same time, provide a low and a high price estimate for each item in their pre-auction catalogues, which may signal the seller's secret reserve price 1 . In the real estate sector the Federal Trade Commission (1983) survey reports that 20.9% of buyers and 30.5% of sellers use the real estate agent's advice as the single most in ‡uential source of information to determine their …r s t price o¤ers and listing prices, respectively. In some bargaining situations the intermediaries may even advise both sides despite an apparent con ‡ict of interests.
While the consumers welcome the intermediaries'advice, they are also concerned about the abuse of the private information by the broker. For example, there has been a serious debate on whether the …n a n c i a l institutions should be allowed to act as realtors. In December 2000 the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department issued a joint proposal which would allow …n a n c i a l holding companies (FHCs) and …n a n c i a l subsidiaries of national banks to engage in real estate brokerage. This proposal met a large discontent of the realtors, and one of the concerns was the endangered consumer privacy. The National Association of Realtors (NAR, 2001) reports that "8 1 % of Americans are worried that their bank could use their private information to sell real estate services to them". NAR's report further argues that "FHC-operated real estate brokerage operations could have access to seller-client …n a n c i a l records and use that private credit information to the detriment of a home-seller...".
Whether intermediaries'advice about other party of potential transaction can be trusted, who gains and who loses from the intermediary's ability to consult his clients and what is its overall welfare e¤ect -these questionsare addressed in this paper. While the role of intermediaries in facilitating bargaining is vastly discussed in the literature, 2 there are relatively few papers that investigate information transmission by intermediaries. Biglaiser (1993) shows that the presence of a middleman, who detects a good's true quality, increases e¢ ciency in a market plagued by adverse selection. One important idea is that a middleman, being a long-lived player, attaches high value to his reputation which prevents him from cheating his customers. Another idea is that being a large player, a middleman has higher incentives to invest in appraising skills. In a similar vein, Dixit (2003) examines provision of information by intermediaries in a dynamic context; the credibility in his model is also reputation-based. Dixit's model deals with ine¢ ciencies due to moral hazard, rather than adverse selection: the intermediary informs its clients about past behavior of their trading partners.
Another strand of related literature investigates intermediaries who provide certi…cation services. Lizzeri (1999) shows that a monopolistic certi…cation intermediary discloses only minimal information consistent with e¢ cient trade, while appropriating a large share of total surplus. However, Lizzeri does not explore incentives of the intermediary to provide the information truthfully -he assumes that the certi…er can commit to any disclosure rule. Strausz (2005) investigates the possibility of capture of the certi…er by producers whose products he must appraise. Honest certi…cation is sustainable only if the discount factor which determines relative weights of short run and long run pro…ts is high enough. In this case the certi…er, willing to stay for a long time at the market, cares about his reputation and does not falsify his reports. The possibility of collusion of intermediary with a seller whose products he certi…es is also investigated in Peyrache and Quesada (2007) .
Abovementioned papers either consider multiperiod settings, in which mechanisms based on reputation ensure the credibility of information transmitted by intermediaries, or assume that the intermediaries can commit to disclosure rules, so that the credibility problem is not an issue. In contrast, we investigate whether the credibility of information transmission can be ensured when there is no commitment to disclosure rules and the interaction is one-shot. Such a framework may be more appropriate in many circumstances because in real life interactions between an intermediary and his clients are often one-shot. Moreover, since advice given to previous clients is usually not observed by a new client, and its quality is di¢ cult to estimate, reputation-based mechanisms of Information transmission by intermediaries is studied from a somewhat di¤erent angle in Baron and Holmström (1980) and Baron (1982) , who investigate the optimal contracts between an issuer and an investment bank which provides advising and distribution services, assuming that the investment banker is better informed about the capital market than the issuer is. Although these papers investigate an intermediary's information services in a static context as we do, the mechanisms ensuring credibility are quite di¤erent. First, the issuer, who purchases the information services from the investment banker, designs the contract which speci…es intermediary's compensation as a function of his report. Second, the intermediary is directly engaged in selling the issue. Therefore, there is a moral hazard dimension which is not discussed in our paper: the banker may underprice the securities to reduce his e¤orts necessary for distribution of the issue. Third, Baron and Holmstrom (1980) and Baron (1982) assume one-sided asymmetric information: only the intermediary has private information about demand for the issue. In our paper the intermediary's client also possesses private information. This assumption, often realistic, plays a key role in sustaining truthful information revelation by the intermediary in our model.
More precisely, we consider a bilateral trade model with an intermediary, who has access to some coarse information about one of the parties (say, the buyer). Trade process is modeled as a double-auction game. The intermediary can a¤ect the seller's bargaining strategy by transmitting his information about the buyer at the pre-bargaining stage, thus reducing information asymmetry between the traders.
First, in Section 3, we assume that the contract between the intermediary and the traders is …x e d exogenously: it consists of a …x e d per-transaction fee. We show that in this setting the intermediary is able to credibly transmit the information he observes by cheap talk 3 . In our set-up the intermediary may be tempted to understate his signal about the buyer's willingness to trade: given that his messages are expected to be truthful, this lie would induce the seller to bid less aggressively thus increasing the probability of trade. However, 3 Farrell and Gibbons (1989) were the …r s t to show that cheap talk can matter in bargaining. Similarly to our setup, in their model parties may announce at the pre-bargaining stage whether they are "keen" or "not keen" to trade. If saying that one is "keen" makes one's partner more likely to negotiate, then it is the keenest types (high-value buyers, lowvalue sellers) who are most willing to say so, and hence cheap talk conveys some meaningful information. Compared to the case without cheap talk, the equilibrium of the modi…ed bargaining game involves more trade when one of the parties has a keen type, and less trade when both parties have intermediate types. See also Mathews and Postlewaite (1989). if participation in bargaining is associated with some (in…nitesimal) costs, a pessimistic message about the buyer's valuation would dissuade sellers with high enough valuation from participating in bargaining. It is this decrease in participation that deters the intermediary from lying. This mechanism of ensuring credibility plays a key role in our paper and di¤erentiates it from other literature about information transmission by intermediaries.
Moreover, we show that truthful communication can be achieved even if the intermediary's information is arbitrarily precise -in a seeming contradiction to Crawford and Sobel (1982) -who derive limits for the amount of information that can be transmitted given a certain degree of con ‡ict of interests. The fact that in our model the advisee -the seller -possesses private information plays crucial role in explaining this disparity between our results and those of Crawford and Sobel. Relatedly, Seidmann (1990) shows, in a di¤erent context, that the receiver's possession of private information may ensure arbitrarily precise communication.
We explore welfare consequences of the intermediary's access to coarse information about the buyer's willingness to trade and ability to transmit this information to the seller. We show that the probability of trade increases, as well as the aggregate welfare; so does intermediary's own pro…t as well as the seller's expected utility. The impact on the buyer is two-fold: buyers who are not eager to trade gain from increased probability of trade, while buyers with high willingness to trade lose since the seller starts playing more aggressively against them. The ex ante welfare of the buyer can either increase or decrease, depending on the parameters.
In Section 4 we explore two potential limits to e¤ective communication. One limit is posed by the intermediary's access to some information about the advisee (i.e. the seller): his better knowledge of the seller's reaction to his report may give the intermediary incentives to understate the buyer's eagerness to trade. Truthtelling equilibrium exists now only under some restrictions on parameters. Another limit to e¤ective communication may be imposed by competition between intermediaries. We consider a stylized model in which two intermediaries, each having one "captured" buyer compete for one seller. Now, in contrast to the previous analysis, the intermediary can be tempted to overstate his buyer's willingness to trade in order to attract the seller. Again, we show that fully revealing equilibria are possible, but only under some restrictions on parameters.
In Section 5 we study a more general problem of designing an optimal trading mechanism by a (partially) informed intermediary (in the same set-up). 4 We …r s t show that in an optimal direct mechanism the intermediary gets the same payo¤ as he would get were his information about the buyer public. We then get back to the decentralized model. The intermediary now o¤ers two-part tari¤s to the buyer and the seller, consisting of a participation and a per-transaction fees. The traders then bargain via a double auction mechanism, in which trade happens if the spread between the bids exceeds the per-transaction fee set up by the broker. We show that there exists a separating equilibrium in which the broker selects di¤erent contracts for different signals he observes, and at the double-auction stage the traders play (piecewise) linear strategies. The intermediary's expected pro…t achieves the upper bound derived via the optimal direct mechanism. The optimal contract speci…es a higher transaction fee when the buyer is eager to trade, as well as a (weakly) higher participation fee. Again, comparing the parties ex ante welfare in the models with informed and uninformed intermediaries, we conclude that the intermediary and the seller always gain from the more precise information and thus improved e¢ ciency, while the impact on the buyer depends on the nature of the intermediary's signal.
2 The Double-Auction Mechanism with an Intermediary
The Model
We consider a simple model of bilateral trade in the presence of an intermediary. As in a standard model (e.g. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) ), there is a seller who can produce a unit of good at cost v S , and a buyer who contemplates buying it and has valuation v B : It is common knowledge that the agents' valuations v S and v B are drawn independently from a uniform distribution on [0; 1], but the valuations themselves are the agents'private information. There is also an intermediary (or a broker) who has no valuation for the good and only implements a transaction between the buyer and the seller. All the parties are risk-neutral and their utility in the absence of trade is normalized to 0. We model the bargaining game between the buyer and the seller as a double auction (see, e.g. Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) ), and assume that the intermediary charges the traders a commission 0 which can depend only 4 Our paper is thus also related to a recent literature on signaling via the choice of mechanism. See, in particular, papers by Cai et al. (2007) , Jullien and Mariotti (2006 : Thus, the parties'expected utilities are
for the buyer and
for the seller, where y is the probability that trade happens. An important feature of the model that distinguishes it from the standard bilateral trade setting is that the intermediary is partially informed about one trader's valuation and can communicate this information to the uninformed party thus a¤ecting her bargaining strategy. More speci…cally, we assume that the broker learns whether the buyer is "eager" or "not eager" to trade: v B 2 [w; 1] or v B 2 [0; w] for some …x e d value w 2 (0; 1). This signal is exogenous, no truthtelling incentive compatibility constraints are to be satis…ed for the intermediary to get this information. There are several justi…cations that can be given for this assumption. One argument is that a professional intermediary has more experience than a seller in interpreting the buyer's observable characteristics or aspects of pre-play behavior, so his knowledge of the buyer's valuation is more precise. Another is that (for similar reasons) the intermediary has better information about the demand for the seller's good, or at least about the distribution of the types of buyers that he can match with the seller. This interpretation seems appropriate in many situations. For example, an art dealer may know better the demand for a particular piece of art than an accidental owner. Similar arguments often apply to other types of intermediaries, such as real estate agents, recruiting agencies, etc. 5 In reality, e.g. for real estate or art brokers, the intermediary's fee usually depends on the trading price; often, it is a certain percent of the price. However, the simple mechanism, to which we restrict attention for tractability reasons, allows to illustrate a number of interesting e¤ects which would be also observed in a more general setting. 6 It can be easily shown that the division of the transaction fee between the buyer and the seller is irrelevant, i.e. the market is not two-sided (see Rochet and Tirole (2006) for an overview of two-sided markets).
The Piecewise-Linear Equilibrium
Let us characterize the traders' behavior at the bargaining stage. There are many equilibria in the standard double auction game (see Leininger et al. (1989) ), and even more equilibria exist if the parties are allowed to engage in cheap talk before submitting the bids (see Farrell and Gibbons (1989) and Mathews and Postlewaite (1989) ). In this paper, however, we restrict attention to equilibria in piecewise-linear strategies, characterized in Lemma 1 below. In particular, we do not allow for a direct pre-play communication between the parties. Lemma 1 extends the results of Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) , where the equilibrium in piecewise-linear strategies is derived for the standard double-auction game with uniformly distributed valuations, to our case of trade with a broker.
Lemma 1 Assume it is common knowledge that the buyer's and the seller's valuations are independent and distributed uniformly on
Then at the bargaining stage there exists an equilibrium in piecewise-linear strategies in which
Then at the bargaining stage there exists an equilibrium in which
Proof. See the Appendix. Conditionp B (v B ) <p S ( v S ) + from the …r s t part of Lemma 1 means that not all types of both parties are sure to trade if they are playing strategies de…ned in (1)-(2). If this condition is satis…ed, there exists an equilibrium in piecewise-linear strategies: those types of seller that trade with probability less than 1 in equilibrium (i.e. v S v S for some thresholdv S ) use (1) : When all types of both parties are sure to trade given strategies (1)- (2)
p S ( v S ) + ; the speci…ed piecewise-linear equilibrium breaks down. Then, as the second part of the Lemma shows, there is an equilibrium in which trade happens with probability 1 and the price is constant, p =
. This equilibrium seems the most natural one, at least when the distributions of the buyer's and the seller's valuations are the same up to a constant:
Cheap Tal k Communication
We assume in this section that the tari¤ is …x e d exogenously. 7 To make things interesting, we assume throughout the paper that w > (otherwise, the broker's private information would have no impact). The broker gets the signal about the buyer's eagerness to trade prior to the double-auction stage. Before the bids are submitted, he can send a message m 2 M about the buyer's eagerness to trade to the seller. The message has no intrinsic cost -it is cheap talk. We assume that the intermediary's message is secret, so the buyer's strategy depends on the message(s) that is expected to be sent in equilibrium and does not change if the broker deviates from his equilibrium announcement strategy.
For a cheap-talk message to have some credibility, the interests of those who send it and of those who attend to it must not be too far apart. In our setting the interests of the intermediary and the seller have an important common element -both want feasible trade to happen. However, the seller faces a trade-o¤ between the probability of exchange and the pro…t she expects from it, whereas the intermediary wants simply to maximize the probability of trade. Thus, it is not a priori clear whether the intermediary is able to communicate the information he observes to the seller.
We suppose that traders have an in…nitesimal cost of submitting a bid. We do not model it explicitly, but assume that if the trader is indi¤erent between submitting a bid or not (which can happen in equilibrium only if the trader perceives the probability to perform a pro…table transaction to be 0), she abstains from bidding. 8 As we shall see, this abstention of the discouraged types of seller from trade plays a crucial role in disciplining the broker.
Ful l y Revealing Equilibria
We shall call an equilibrium fully revealing if the intermediary can credibly communicate all his information to the seller, i.e. the seller's beliefs about the buyer's valuation induced by the intermediary's message coincide with the intermediary's own beliefs. We now want to explore the existence of fully revealing equilibria.
9 Note that since the intermediary's information is binary, a binary message space is su¢ cient to fully transmit the intermediary's information. Since we are interested in the existence of fully revealing equilibria, we shall assume without loss that there are just two messages, M = f"eager","not eager"g.
Proposition 1
There exists a fully revealing equilibrium in which the intermediary truthfully reports the buyer's eagerness to trade to the seller, and the traders follow piecewise-linear bidding strategies speci…ed in Lemma 1.
Proof. We only need to check that the intermediary has incentives to tell the truth if the parties expect that he will do so.
If the buyer is not eager to trade, the intermediary can only lose from lying -this would induce the seller to increase the price fromp ; which would only reduce the probability of trade.
If the buyer is eager to trade, lying induces the seller to reduce the price fromp (1 w) 2 , and the 8 This behavior would be rational even if there were a small probability that the broker makes mistakes in determining the buyer's eagerness -it su¢ ces to require that the probability of mistakes be su¢ ciently small (for a given cost of submitting a bid).
9 As in any cheap talk game, there exists a babbling equilibrium in which the intermediary transmits a message uncorrelated with his signal and the seller gives it no credibility. A babbling equilibrium at the …r s t stage followed by some equilibrium of the double auction (with the intermediary) without communication is an equilibrium of the whole game. (1 w)
2 (see Figure 1) : the loss exceeds the gain for any value of w 2 (0; 1).
The proof of Proposition 1 illustrates the intermediary's fundamental tradeo¤ between a higher probability of participation of the seller and his less aggressive pricing. When it is common knowledge that the buyer is not eager to trade, the sellers with low valuation (v S < v S ) charge a lower price than in the equilibrium where the buyer is eager to trade. However, for sellers with higher valuations (v S > v S ) probability to trade with a "bad" buyer is zero, so, they lose nothing if they abstain from bidding. Since the intermediary is interested in maximizing the volume of trade, he might seem to be tempted to deviate from the equilibrium behavior and always report that the buyer is not eager to trade because such a message makes the seller reduce the price when v S < v S . However, as Proposition 1 shows, the potential gain from such a deviation is more than o¤set by the loss coming from the abstention of the sellers with v S > v S : 10 10 If the messages are public, a fully revealing equilibrium also exists, where the traders play the same equilibrium strategies as in the equilibrium with private messages described in Proposition 1.
Once again, the broker can be only tempted to understate the buyer's eagerness. Assume that he does so. The di¤erence now is that the buyer can detect the broker's deviation and thus he plays a best response to the seller's strategyp The mechanism that ensures credibility of the intermediary's advise is different from the reputation-based mechanisms studied in the literature (e.g. Biglaiser (1993) , Dixit (2003) ). While reputation-based models are inherently dynamic, we show that the intermediary's credibility can be achieved in a static context. This static nature makes our model related to an extensive literature on expert advise, which largely elaborates on Crawford and Sobel's (1982) model. 11 The main di¤erence is that we consider a speci…c cost of false advice that an intermediary is facing -the discouragement of his clients from bargaining -that is not studied in that literature.
We l f a r e
In our analysis of welfare implications of the intermediary's access to information about the buyer we restrict ourselves to fully revealing equilibria in which traders play piecewise-linear strategies from Lemma 1. The previous analysis shows that, when the broker possesses information about the buyer that he then truthfully communicates to the seller, gains from trade are realized on a larger set of valuations than in the case of an uninformed intermediary. Hence, the intermediary's ability to observe and communicate information increases the aggregate welfare. However, as the following Proposition shows, it is not necessarily true that all participants gain from the intermediary's being informed.
Proposition 2 (i) The intermediary's expected pro…t is higher if he is able to observe the buyer's predisposition to trade and communicate it to the seller.
(ii) The seller with any valuation v S 2 [0; 1] either strictly gains from the intermediary's ability to observe the buyer's predisposition to trade and communicate it or gets the same utility as with uninformed intermediary.
(iii) The buyer with valuation v B 2 [0; w] either strictly gains from the intermediary's ability to observe her predisposition to trade and communicate it or gets the same utility as with uninformed intermediary; the buyer with valuation v B 2 [w; 1] either strictly loses or gets the same utility.
Proof. See the Appendix. The fact that the intermediary gains from communicating his information is quite intuitive: the probability of trade increases and the intermediary's pro…t deviation in the case of private messages, so the deviation is not pro…table.
11 See, e.g., Grossman and Helpman (2001) for a review.
in our setup is proportional to it. It is also quite clear that the seller should gain: she is able to adapt her bidding strategy -bid less aggressively if the buyer is known not to be eager to trade (v B 2 [0; w]), or, in contrast, submit higher bids if the buyer is known to be interested in trade (v B 2 [0; w]), thus increasing the gains without compromising the probability of trade. Finally, if the buyer is not eager to trade (v B 2 [0; w]), she gains from the seller's learning this: the seller adapts her strategy and submits lower bids. In contrast, if the buyer is eager to trade, she su¤ers from the seller's learning this, since the seller starts submitting higher bids. The following proposition evaluates the impact of the observability of the buyer's predisposition to trade on the ex ante welfare of the traders. A direct consequence of Proposition 2 is that the seller unambiguously gains. However, the buyer's welfare can increase or decrease, depending on the characteristics of the information structure. ; the buyer gains from the intermediary's ability to observe her predisposition to trade and communicate it.
Proposition 3 (i) If
(ii) If w < the buyer loses from the intermediary's ability to observe her predisposition to trade and communicate it.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Fine Information Structures
To check the robustness of the fully revealing communication, let us consider an alternative information structure: assume now that the intermediary observes to which element [ i n ; i+1 n ]; i 2 0; :::; n 1 of a uniform n element partition of the unit interval belongs the buyer's type. When n tends to in…nity, the intermediary's information about the buyer becomes arbitrarily precise. As the following proposition shows, the full revelation result continues to hold in this setting for any n. revealing equilibrium in which the intermediary truthfully reports the buyer's eagerness to trade to the seller.
Proof. See the Appendix. The result is in sharp contrast with the standard intuition of cheap talk communication models à la Crawford and Sobel (1982) , where the sender can communicate his information to the receiver only with some noise, the amount of noise being increasing as the interests of the parties become more diverged. In our model there is an additional complication: the sender (i.e. the broker) is uncertain about the receiver's (i.e. the seller's) reaction to his announcement since he does not observe the seller's type. Despite an apparent con ‡ict of interests (the seller is concerned with both the probability of trade and the expected surplus in case of trade, whereas the broker cares only about the probability of trade), the broker can communicate arbitrarily …n e information to the seller. The reason is that the broker's inability to predict the seller's reaction prevents him from understating the buyer's valuation. As Section 4.1 shows, when the broker becomes better informed about the seller's own valuation and his ability to predict the seller's reaction is thus improved, no fully revealing equilibrium can exist for some values of parameters. 
Two-Sided Advice
We have seen in the previous section that when the intermediary gets a signal about the demand for the seller's good, he can credibly transmit this information to the seller and thus increase the e¢ ciency of trade. We now explore what happens when the intermediary is able to observe signals about the valuations of both participants. Is he still able to share this information with the parties? We shall see that, in contrast to Proposition 1, the answer depends now on the parameters of the model.
Assume the intermediary observes two signals: the …r s t signal, as before, reveals whether the buyer is eager to trade (v B 2 [w; 1]) or not (v B 2 [0; w]); the second signal reveals whether the seller is eager to trade (v S 2 [0; 1 w]) or not (v S 2 [1 w; 1]). In particular, we assume for simplicity that the 13 The idea that the receiver's private information can guarantee e¤ective cheap-talk communication even in a situation of sharp con ‡ict of interests dates back to Seidmann (1990) . The receiver's possession of private information may have important implications in more general signaling models. For example, Feltovich et al. (2002) show that it can lead to "countersignaling", that is, the sender's action becoming non-monotonic in his type. signals about both traders have equal ex ante informativeness. As before, the intermediary's reports to the parties are assumed to be secret.
Proposition 5 A fully revealing equilibrium, in which the intermediary truthfully reports each trader's eagerness to her counterpart and the traders follow piecewise-linear bidding strategies speci…ed in Lemma 1 exists if and only if w , the parties are sure to trade when it is common knowledge that both are eager, so the intermediary has no interest in falsifying this information. When w
; falsi…cation of the report is too costly for the intermediary -too many types who have no chance to trade with non-eager partner refuse to trade after getting a false pessimistic report. In the intermediate case, however, truthtelling cannot be induced.
Corollary 1 Assume that the intermediary observes the type of both parties but gives advise to only one of them (say, the seller). Then, truthtelling can be induced only if w and both traders are eager to trade. If truthtelling equilibrium did exist, then the players would follow the same strategies as in the case of two-sided advice covered in Proposition 5 (when the buyer knows that the seller is eager she plays the same strategy as when she is uninformed about the seller's type -see Lemma 1 for the speci…cation of equilibrium strategies). Then, the intermediaries incentives to mislead the seller would be the same as in the case of two-sided advice. Hence, as the proof of Proposition 5 shows, he would like to lie to the seller breaking the truthtelling equilibrium.
Corollary 1 once again emphasizes that even with one-sided advice, the intermediary must not be too well informed about the advisee in order to have incentives for truthful revelation of information: his ability to predict the seller's reaction tempts him to understate the buyer's eagerness to trade.
Competition between Intermediaries
In this section we consider a simple model of competition between intermediaries. Assume there are two intermediaries, I 1 and I 2 , and each intermediary has one (captured) buyer, B i ; i = 1; 2, ready to perform a transaction via the intermediary. The buyers' valuations v B i ; i = 1; 2; are independent and uniformly distributed on [0; 1]: There is one seller (with valuation v S , uniformly distributed on [0; 1]) and intermediaries compete for this seller. Once the seller chooses the intermediary, e.g. I 1 , the game proceeds as described in Section 2: the seller and the buyer B 1 play a double auction game and transaction happens if the bid/ask spread exceeds the per transaction price charged by the intermediary, 1 .
As before, we assume that each intermediary observes whether his buyer is eager to trade or not, v B i 2 [w; 1] or [0; w]. This signal is the intermediary's private information, neither the seller nor the competing intermediary have any information about the intermediary's captured buyer (except prior distribution of her types). Before the seller makes her choice, each intermediary announces to the seller whether his buyer is eager to trade or not; these announcements are made simultaneously. Importantly, we assume that these announcements are the only means of competition between the intermediaries: per transaction prices 1 ; 2 are assumed to be exogenously …x e d at some level : While this assumption is not very realistic, it greatly simpli…es the analysis and still allows to illustrate important trade-o¤s the intermediaries are facing. Prices for intermediaries'services may be sticky since it may be too costly to adjust them for each transaction. This argument justi…es the assumption that prices are …x e d for each given transaction and do not depend on the willingness to pay of the particular buyer. Moreover, the assumption that they are equal, 1 = Proposition 6 Ful ly revealing equilibrium exists in a model with competing intermediaries if and only if w 2 [0; w( )] for some threshold w( ):
Proof. See the Appendix. In the proof we show that an intermediary may be only tempted to overstate his buyer's willingness to trade in order to attract the seller: the incentive constraint preventing understatement of the buyer's willingness to trade is never binding. This is in sharp contrast to the case of monopolistic intermediary, who cannot gain from overstatement of the buyer's eagerness to trade but may be tempted to understate it in order to soften the seller's bidding strategy.
Given that only "no overstatement"constraint may be binding, the results of Proposition 6 are quite intuitive. Indeed, when w is small, an intermediary will not want to attract the seller by overstating his buyer's willingness to trade since the probability of trade of a non-eager buyer with overoptimistic seller is too low in this case.
Signaling via Two-Part Tari ¤s
In this section we return to the case of a monopolistic intermediary and now endogenize the intermediary's choice of contract. We …r s t derive the optimal (from the intermediary's viewpoint) direct mechanism. Then, extending analysis in the previous sections, we assume that the intermediary charges the traders two-part tari¤s consisting of …x e d fees for participation ( B for the buyer and S for the seller) and a commission which can depend only on the fact of trade, .
14 Since the parties are risk-neutral and care only about expected payments, we can assume without loss that the intermediary charges a fee =2 from each trader if trade happens and nothing otherwise.
The Optimal Direct Mechanism
In the absence of information observed by the broker, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) have characterized a direct mechanism maximizing the broker's ex ante pro…t. They have shown that it is optimal for the broker to implement trade if and only if the buyer's "virtual valuation"(i.e. his true valuation minus the information rent required to induce truthtelling) exceeds that of the seller, which for the case of uniform distributions on [0; 1] means that v B v S + 1 2 ; and to leave no surplus to the worst buyer (v B = 0) and to the worst seller (v S = 1). These conditions uniquely determine the expected transfers from the buyer to the broker and from the broker to the seller.
The broker can use his information about the buyer in designing the optimal mechanism. For example, as Mylovanov (2005) shows, in quasi-linear environments with independent private valuations the informed principal implements an ex ante optimal allocation.
15 Skreta (2010) shows a similar result in the context of an informed seller problem, where the seller's private information is correlated with the buyers'valuations: she shows that the optimal mechanism gives the seller the same expected surplus as he would get after full disclosure of his private information. A similar result is obtained in our model. Indeed, by the inscrutability principle (a generalization of the revelation principle to the informed principal setting -see Myerson, 1983 ) the upper bound of the broker's expected pro…t can be found through the optimal direct truthful mechanism, which speci…es the probability of trade and the expected payments from the buyer to the broker and from the broker to the seller as functions of the three parties'reports, subject to the incentive compatibility and interim participation constraints. The optimal mechanism 16 is described in Proposition 7. Proof. See the Appendix. Proposition 7 shows that the broker obtains the same expected pro…t as he would get if he shared his signal about the buyer's valuation with the seller and then used an optimal direct mechanism to which only the buyer and the seller would report their valuations. Note that in our setting where the broker's own announcement can be veri…ed ex post (assuming that the buyer truthfully reveals his type), it is costless for the broker to induce his own truthtelling once the buyer's truthtelling is secured.
Optimal Two-Part Tari ¤s
We shall show now that by choosing an appropriate menu of two-part tari¤s the intermediary can achieve the same pro…t as in the optimal direct mechanism. We assume the following timing. First, the broker speci…es a set T of two-part 15 A similar result in somewhat more restrictive context was obtained in Maskin and Tirole (1990) and (1992) . 16 The mechanism is uniquely de…ned by the probability of trade and the expected utility of the buyers and the sellers with valuations v B = 1, v B = w and v S = 0. Transfer functions can be speci…ed in multiple ways, but the expected payment of each type of agent is the same (see Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) ). tari¤s ( B ; S ; ). Then, the traders observe their private valuations and the broker learns whether v B 2 [0; w] or v B 2 [w; 1]: The broker publicly announces a two-part tari¤ from the set T .
17 Next, the parties choose whether they want to participate in the double auction and if they choose to participate, they pay the participation fees and submit their bids. Finally, if the bids p S and p B are submitted and the spread p B p S exceeds , the broker implements a transaction at price p = p B +p S 2
. We keep assuming that traders have an in…nitesimal cost of submitting a bid, and that at the double auction stage they play piecewise-linear equilibrium strategies speci…ed in Lemma 1.
As the following Proposition shows, the intermediary can achieve the highest pro…t characterized in Proposition 7 through an appropriately chosen system of two-part tari¤s.
Proposition 8 There exists a menu of two-part tari¤s T = f(
NE )g which gives the broker the same expected pro…t as the optimal direct mechanism.
When the buyer is eager (v B 2 [w; 1]), the optimal tari¤ is E = Proof. See the Appendix.
We l f a r e
It is natural that the intermediary gains from learning a signal about the buyer's valuation. Looking at how the optimal mechanism takes this information into account one should expect that the seller also gains: the intermediary charges a lower fee when the buyer is not eager and trade happens more often. As for the buyer, the impact of the loss of privacy on her welfare is ambiguous: on the one hand, when the intermediary learns that the buyer is not eager to trade, he charges a lower transaction fee than he would in the absence of the knowledge on the buyer's predisposition to trade (on top of direct bene…t this also makes the seller's bidding less aggressive). On the other hand, the buyer pays a participation fee if she is discovered to be eager to trade, the fee she does not pay if the intermediary is completely agnostic about her willingness to trade. Besides, as in the cheap-talk setting, the seller bids more aggressively. As Proposition 9 shows, which e¤ect dominates is determined by the quality of information: if the signal that the buyer is "eager" is relatively weak (i.e. w is not too high), the …r s t e¤ect dominates and the buyer bene…ts from the …n e r information together with the other players; if the signal that the buyer is "eager" is relatively strong (w is high enough), the second e¤ect dominates and the buyer loses.
Proposition 9 (i) The observability of the buyer's predisposition increases the probability of trade; the ex ante welfare of the seller and of the broker is higher than in the benchmark no-signal case.
(ii) There exists w 2 1 2
; 1 such that the buyer gains from her predisposition being discovered and communicated if w < w and loses if w > w.
Conclusions
Our analysis shows that the intermediary can credibly transmit the information he possesses about one of the bargaining parties (the buyer) to the other (the seller). The mechanism ensuring credibility is di¤erent from reputationbased mechanisms considered in the previous literature. Rather, it relies on a trade-o¤ the intermediary is facing between inducing "softer" bargaining by the stronger types of the advisee and discouraging her weaker types from participating in the bargaining. An important element of our analysis is twosided asymmetric information: the intermediary does not know the willingness to trade of the advisee (the seller) and thus cannot predict her reaction to a report about the buyer's willingness to trade.
We reveal two factors that can undermine the credibility of the intermediary's advice. First, his ability to better predict the reaction of the seller may undermine incentives for truthful information revelation. Second, when intermediaries (endowed with "captured" buyers) are competing, they may be tempted to overstate their buyer's willingness to trade in order to attract the seller, even at the cost of more aggressive pricing on her part.
Finally, concerns about losses that some consumers may incur from the lack of privacy vis-à-vis the intermediary (as in the case of real estate services provided by a consumer's bank) are shown to be justi…ed: although the aggregate welfare increases when an intermediary becomes partially informed, some consumers (the buyers in our model) may get worse o¤.
In future work we would like to examine competition between intermediaries in more detail. In particular, price competition between intermediaries may be modelled explicitly. Another interesting extension may be a model, where the sellers can either apply to an (imperfectly informed) intermediary to be matched with a buyer or go directly to the search market (as in Gehrig (1993)). Then, what types of sellers will choose to trade through the intermediary? If the buyers also have choice, what buyers will choose to be matched through the intermediary?
It is also important to investigate the intermediary's incentives to collect information. Our analysis assumed that the intermediary always gets an exogenous signal, but in some circumstances it may be more natural to presume that the intermediary has to exert e¤ort to get a signal.
Appendix
The Proof of Lemma 1. (i) Assume the seller plays the speci…ed strategy.
Taking …r s t -o r d e r condition we get, after some simpli…cations,
In the latter case it is optimal to set p B (v B ) =p S (v S ) + (i.e. the minimal p B such that Prfp S (v S ) p B ; v S v S g = 1).
the buyer plays the indicated equilibrium strategy.
(ii) Given that the seller plays p S (v S ) = (v B + v S )=2 it is indeed optimal for the buyer to play
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider …r s t the benchmark case where the intermediary has no access to information about the buyer. Given equilibrium strategies, speci…ed in Lemma 1, one easily …n d s the expected utilities of the parties:
(1 );
Assume now that the intermediary learns the buyer's predisposition to trade and fully revealing equilibrium is played. Consider, …r s t , the case when the buyer is not eager to trade, v B 2 [0; w]: The probability of trade now is Prftrade j NEg = 9(w ) 2 32w
; so the intermediary's expected pro…t is U ;
Consider now the other case, when the buyer is eager, v B 2 [w; 1]: Assume …r s t that w : Then the probability of trade is Prftrade j Eg = ;
Otherwise, if w > ; the probability of trade is Prftrade j Eg = ;and the parties'expected payo¤s are (1 );
Note, …r s t , that the expected probability of trade with informed intermediary, Prftrade j Eg(1 w) + Prftrade j NEgw; is greater than the expected probability of trade with the uninformed one,
; which proves that the intermediary gets better o¤ from access to the signal about the buyer.
The result concerning the seller follows from comparison of U and are indi¤erent otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 3. Part (i) follows immediately from Proposition 2. For parts (ii) and (iii), note that in the benchmark case, when the intermediary is not able to observe the buyer's predisposition to trade, the buyer's ex ante expected utility is EU B = 9 128
(1 ) 3 (it is derived by taking expectation of U B (v B ) from the proof of Proposition 2). When the intermediary is informed, the buyer's expected utility is ; so that sellers with valuations v S v
) participate in the bargaining. Assume the intermediary reports truthfully the buyer's eagerness, i.e. sends message
First, note the intermediary cannot gain from overstating the buyer's eagerness. Indeed, if the intermediary deviates and reports j > i; each type of seller submits a higher bid (see equilibrium strategies in Lemma 1) thus reducing the probability of trade. There is a second e¤ect, potentially positive: some types of seller that abstained from bargaining under truthtelling, start participating if the buyer's eagerness is overstated. However, since the seller's strategy is increasing in her type, none of these types of seller actually trades with a positive probability, so the e¤ect of overstating the buyer's eagerness is unambiguously negative for the intermediary.
Assume now that the intermediary understates the buyer's eagerness to trade and reports j < i. It is easy to see from the speci…cation of equilibrium strategies in Lemma 1 that trade happens if v B v S + 1 4n
) (the latter condition ensures that seller of type v S …n d s it worthwhile to participate in bargaining). It is easy to check that the second inequality implies the …r s t .
A positive gain from downward deviation can occur only ifv
: the right-hand side of this inequality gives the value of v S for which the probability of trade equals 1 under truthtelling; if this condition is not satis…ed, downward deviation brings no gain from less aggressive pricing but only losses from reduces participation. This inequality, when simpli…ed, reduces to j +1 i > 1 3
; which implies that j = i 1 is a necessary condition for a downward deviation to be pro…table. Like in the proof of Proposition 1, it is easy to check that the deviation to j = i 1 brings gain from less aggressive bidding that is equal to ; so it is clearly unpro…table.
Proof of Proposition 5. To prove the "if" part, we, as in Proposition 1, only need to check that the intermediary wants to say the truth if he expects the parties to believe his messages. It is clear that the intermediary never wants to tell that a party is eager to trade if this is not true: it would only decrease the probability of trade (this follows immediately from the speci…cation of equilibrium bidding strategies in Lemma 1).
Let us verify that the intermediary tells the truth if both parties are eager to trade. . According to Lemma 1, in this case they trade with probability 1 at price 1 2
; and the intermediary has no incentive to lie.
Assume that (w )). Then, the situation is represented on Figure 2 . The gain from lying to the seller about the buyer's type while telling the truth to the buyer is the area of ABC triangle, while the loss is the area of CDEF trapezoid (after a false report to the seller and a truthful report to the buyer trade occurs when ; there is no cost of lying (to either one party or both) and a positive gain: since v S = 3 4 (w ) > 1 w; lying would result in trade with probability one were the parties to believe the intermediary's reports. A fully revealing equilibrium does not exist for this range of w.
Along similar lines it is easy to check that lying (to one or both parties) is not bene…cial if w < : When just one trader is eager to trade the analysis proceeds analogously and shows that the intermediary never gains from lying in this case.
Proof of Proposition 6. Assume that an intermediary, say I 1 , faces an eager buyer. If he reports this truthfully, the seller will choose him with probability 1 2
(1 w)+w: Indeed, with probability w the other buyer, B 2 , is not eager, so the seller chooses I 1 ; with probability 1 w buyer B 2 is also eager, then I 1 gets the seller with probability 1=2. The intermediary's expected pro…t if she reports truthfully and gets the seller is : eager to trade. Then, the probability to attract the seller goes down to , so an intermediary never has an incentive to understate his buyer's willingness to trade in a competitive situation.
Assume now that B 1 is not eager to trade. If the intermediary reports the truth he attracts the seller with probability w=2 and his expected pro…t is
:
If I 1 overstates his buyer's eagerness to trade, he gets the seller with a higher probability, 1 2
(1 w) + w: However, the seller will compete more aggressively, so the probability of trade conditional on attracting the seller is now lower, : Otherwise, truthtelling constraint is equivalent to a polynomial inequality (cubic in w): 
Analytical solution of this inequality is too cumbersome; Figure 3 gives a plot of polynomial (5) in blue color; it also represents a plot of plane w ( ) in green and a plot of zero-level surface in yellow.
The …g u r e shows that truthtelling constraint is satis…ed if w 2 [ ; w( )] and not satis…ed if w 2 [ w( ); 1] for some threshold w( ):
Assume now that the intermediary deviates and reports that B 1 is not Figure 3: (1983) one easily shows that the broker's expected pro…t NE )g; where the two tari¤s are as speci…ed in the Proposition. We need to show that the broker's choice of tari¤ once he observes the signal is incentive compatible and that these tari¤s lead to the same expected pro…t as the optimal direct mechanism. Then, the choice of T is an optimal one.
A) Assume that the buyer is eager, v B 2 [w; 1] and that w which can be shown to be smaller than ER for all w 2 [ 1 2
; 1]: The seller's expected return can be easily checked to be the same as in the optimal direct mechanism. D) Assume that the buyer is not eager, v B 2 [0; w]; and that w > Thus, when the intermediary observes the buyer's eagerness to trade, the ex ante expected utilities for the case w < 1 2 are Proof of Proposition 9. One can check that under the optimal two-part tari¤ the ex ante expected utility of the buyer, the seller and the broker in the
